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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the analysis of the indirect effects 
of active labour market policies. Indirect effects arise where some of the improved 
labour market outcomes for programme participants come at the expense of other 
workers or jobseekers. The paper outlines some common theories about how 
indirect effects operate, and discusses approaches to estimating the strength of 
indirect effects. It also presents a brief summary of relevant empirical findings. 
The paper is intended as a relatively non-technical guide for policy analysts 
working on the design, costing, and evaluation of active labour market policies. 
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 1 
Introduction 
This paper outlines theoretical and estimation issues related to the 
indirect effects of active labour market policies (ALMPs). It also presents a brief 
summary of relevant empirical findings.  
The direct effect of ALMPs is the effect that the policy has on those 
who receive assistance (‘the treatment group’). It is useful to distinguish between 
gross outcomes (the outcomes experienced by the treatment group), and net 
outcomes (the change in outcomes experienced by the treatment group, beyond 
what they would have experienced in the absence of the assistance). The direct 
effect is equivalent to the net outcome. 
The indirect effect is the effect that an ALMP has on people other than 
those in the treatment group. Indirect effects can take many forms, as will be 
discussed in later sections. In general, the nature of indirect effects is that some of 
the gains made by the treatment group are at the expense of other workers or 
jobseekers.
1 For instance, members of the treatment group may find employment, 
but this is only possible because they have filled jobs that would otherwise have 
been filled by non-assisted workers. 
From an efficiency perspective, an ALMP should achieve strong 
positive direct effects without any negative indirect effects. In essence, this 
requires that new jobs are created as a consequence of the policy. The treatment 
group members need not be placed in the new jobs, but the number of new jobs 
must be at least as great as the direct effect for the treatment group. ALMPs are 
often, however, designed to achieve equity objectives as well. Policies may aim to 
improve the employment prospects of disadvantaged workers, in which case 
policies may be desirable even if there is no net increase in employment. The 
current paper focuses solely on the analysis of indirect effects, without making 
any judgements about the desirability of policies with different levels of indirect 
effects.  
                                                             
1 As we will see, it is possible that the gains of the treatment group generate gains for untreated 
workers, although this is a less common case, both in theory and in empirical findings. 2 
The focus of the following theory section is on the ways that indirect 
effects may arise, and the conditions under which ALMPs can generate additional 
employment. The sections on empirical approaches and findings will report on 
attempts to measure the size of indirect effects of various policies, and the impact 
of ALMPs on total employment. 
Although the primary focus is on employment effects, as it is in the 
literature reviewed, the paper will also, where appropriate, discuss the effects of 
ALMPs on wage levels and on fiscal expenditure. 
2  Some theories about indirect effects 
This section outlines some of the key ideas about how indirect effects 
arise. Within the literature on indirect effects, the concepts of substitution effects 
and displacement effects have received particular attention. These effects relate, 
however, only to programmes that alter the relative labour costs associated with 
the treatment group, such as wage subsidy programmes. I start therefore by 
analysing the impact of wage subsidies, before moving on to a broader range of 
programmes.  
Some important insights into the indirect effects of ALMPs, and the 
ability of ALMPs to generate employment increases, can be gained from the 
standard competitive neoclassical model of supply and demand. This approach 
does not, however, explicitly model some of the mechanisms by which ALMPs 
affect outcomes. I therefore also present some analyses using a more refined 
model, attributed to Layard and Nickell, which is commonly used to provide a 
framework for analysing the effects of ALMPs. 
2.1  Policies that change relative labour costs: wage 
subsidies 
Figure 1(a) shows a standard neoclassical analysis of labour supply and 
demand, incorporating the effect of a universal wage subsidy. LS is the labour 
supply curve, indicating how much labour workers are willing to provide at each 
wage level. The curve is upward sloping, reflecting that workers will require 
increasingly high wages to induce them to give up more non-work time. LD0 is 3 
labour demand in the absence of a subsidy. It is downward sloping, reflecting the 
assumption that additional input of labour into production makes progressively 
smaller contributions to output, and employers are therefore willing to employ 
more labour only if wages are lower. The initial equilibrium is at point A, with E0 
workers employed at wage w0. 
The impact of a universal wage subsidy is indicated by the line labelled 
LD1. Employers are willing to employ more labour at any given wage level. Faced 
with a subsidy of $s, they will employ labour up to the point E1, where they pay 
w1 - s and workers receive wages of w1.  
Figure 1: Analysis of the impact of a wage subsidy 






























Note that the subsidy scheme characterised in this way is very costly. 
The employer receives a subsidy for all workers, including the E0 workers who 
were previously employed. In practice, many wage subsidy programmes are 
designed with the intent of subsidising only those jobs within a firm that are in 
excess of initial employment E0. Graphically, this intent is reflected by adding 
only the solid portion of LD1. Under such conditions, all employees receive the 
same wage but some employees are less costly to the employer, due to the 
subsidy. The employer would prefer to employ the cheaper (subsidised) workers 
instead of the unsubsidised ones, and if possible, will try to substitute subsidised 
for unsubsidised workers. This process of substituting cheaper for more expensive 
workers is one of the main types of indirect effect of wage subsidies and is 
commonly referred to as the substitution effect. 
Having secured subsidies for (E1 – E0) employees, the employer has an 
incentive to reduce the employment of unsubsidised workers (as long as the 
administrative rules do not cause the subsidy to be lost when employment is 
reduced). With wages at w1, the employer is making a loss on each unsubsidised 
worker in excess of E2 (wages are above LD1). If any unsubsidised workers were 
to leave, the employer would not replace them unless total employment fell below 
the initial employment level, E0. Figure 1(b) shows the equilibrium if the 
employer manages to achieve full substitution. Employment and wage levels are 
exactly the same as they were initially—the only difference is that the employer is 
now receiving a subsidy of $s on each of the (E1 - E0) subsidised workers. There 
has been 100% substitution of subsidised for unsubsidised workers. 
The 100% substitution is a consequence of the assumption that all 
workers are identical. A more general (and more interesting) case arises where 
subsidised workers differ from the initially employed workers. A crucial factor 
then is how the addition of unsubsidised workers affects the productivity, wages, 
and employment of unsubsidised workers.
2  
                                                             
2 Technically, this relationship is measured as the elasticity of substitution between subsidised and 
unsubsidised workers. Although related, this use of the word ‘substitution’ differs from its use to 
describe the indirect impact of wage subsidies. 5 
It is generally assumed (and found empirically) that the addition of 
subsidised workers leads to a reduction in the number of unsubsidised workers 
who are employed. This is consistent with the two types of workers being 
substitutes in production. It is, however, theoretically possible that subsidised 
workers may be ‘complements’ to unsubsidised workers, meaning that the 
addition of subsidised workers raises the marginal productivity of unsubsidised 
workers, thus leading to increased employment.  
When measuring substitution effects of wage subsidies, it is common to 
define the substitution rate as one minus the ratio of net employment change to the 
number of subsidised jobs [1 - ∆E/Ns]. The analysis presented above indicates the 
wide range of possible values for this ratio. Without production 
complementarities, the net employment change is between zero and (E1 - E0). The 
number of subsidised workers is between (E1 - E0) and E1 (employers would 
prefer to have subsidies for all of their workers, if permitted). The substitution rate 
can therefore be as low as 0, and as high as 1. The more similar are subsidised and 
unsubsidised workers, the higher the substitution rate will be. With production 
complementarities, the increase in employment could be larger than the number of 
subsidised workers, so the substitution rate could be negative. The extent of 
substitution is an empirical question to which we will return in Section 4. 
Figure 1(b) also serves to illustrate the related issue of displacement 
effects. The employer is receiving a subsidy, with wage and employment levels 
that are the same as they would have been in the absence of the subsidy. The 
effect of the subsidy is thus to raise the profits of the employer. The employer is 
able to produce output at a lower cost than unsubsidised competitors, and is able 
to increase market share by undercutting competitors. This would lead to an 
expansion of employment in the subsidised firm, at the expense of jobs in 
unsubsidised firms. The expansion of employment in the subsidised firm is 
achieved by displacing employment elsewhere. 
A further indirect effect not shown in Figure 1(b) is the fiscal effect. 
The subsidy payment of $s(E1 – E0) to the employer is paid for from funds raised 6 
by taxation. The impact on aggregate employment of the taxes should also be 
counted as part of the wider impact of the subsidy programme.  
2.2 Other  policies 
Despite the prominence given to substitution and displacement effects 
in the literature, they strictly apply only to policies such as wage subsidies that 
alter the relative costs of different types of labour or groups of workers. There are 
many other forms of ALMP that do not rely on changing relative costs. They 
therefore do not have substitution or displacement effects, at least in the strict 
sense outlined in the previous section. There may, however, be other forms of 
indirect effect, whereby some of the gains of the treatment group are at the 
expense of workers who are not assisted. A simple example will serve to illustrate 
the mechanisms.  

















Figure 2 shows labour supply and labour demand. Where the curves 
cross is the unique equilibrium where supply and demand are equal. In this model 
there are only two ways to generate an increase in employment. Either labour 
supply must increase, so that more labour is supplied at any given wage, or 
productivity must increase, so that employers are willing to employ more workers 
at any given wage. 
The relevance of this model for the consideration of indirect effects of 
ALMPs is that it shows how wage flexibility can offset some of the direct effect 
of ALMPs. The dotted line in Figure 2 shows the effect of an ALMP that has 7 
increased labour supply, possibly by reconnecting discouraged workers with the 
labour market. At any given wage, there are now more workers willing to work. 
The number of additional workers is equal to the difference between E1 and E0. 
However, employers are not willing to employ this many workers at the initial 
wage level—they are still willing to employ only the same number as they were 
initially. Wages fall, until labour supply and labour demand are again equal, at 
point C, where employment equals E2.
3  
So, what are the direct and indirect effects of the policy to increase 
labour supply by (E1 – E0)? For ease of exposition, the initial number of workers 
(E0) is normalised to be equal to 1. The number of additional workers, expressed 
as a proportion of the initial employment, is 1+T, and the number of additional 
jobs is 1+λT, where λ<1. The net change in employment is (E2 – E0), or λT. 
However, the direct effect experienced by the treatment group may be larger or 
smaller than this.  
If there is no turnover in the labour market, all of those who were 
initially employed retain their jobs, and a proportion of the treatment group gain 
employment. The proportion is λT/T = λ. Analogously to the calculation of the 
substitution rate, we can define a ‘crowding-out rate’, which is 1 minus the ratio 
of net employment change to the number of the treatment group gaining 
employment (1 - ∆E/de) where de is the direct effect of treatment on the treated. 
In the ‘no turnover’ case, the direct effect (de) is that λT of the treatment group 
gain employment. The change in employment (∆E) is also λT, so that the 
crowding-out rate equals zero. 
                                                             
3 In this figure, employment increases by less than half of the increase in the number of workers, 
due to the fact that the labour demand curve is steeper than the labour supply curve. This is a fair 
representation of average labour demand and supply elasticities (slopes), although the relevant 
slopes may be different for different groups of workers. For instance, labour supply is fairly 
inelastic (steep) for married prime-aged males, and elastic (flat) for single youth. Labour demand 
is more elastic (flatter) for low-skilled workers. In general, policies to increase labour supply will 
have smaller wage effects, and thus larger employment effects, where labour demand is elastic and 
labour supply is inelastic. Similarly, policies to increase labour demand will have a larger 
employment impact when labour demand is inelastic and supply is elastic. Unfortunately, this 
means that policies have the greatest employment effects where the curve they are targeting is least 
responsive (inelastic). 8 
In contrast, if jobs last only for one period, and everyone has to apply 
for the available jobs, there are (1+λT) jobs available for (1+T) workers. 
Assuming that everyone, including the T members of the treatment group, has an 
equal chance (p) of getting a job, the probability equals (1+λT)/(1+T). As long as 
λ<1 (i.e. as long as labour supply is not totally inelastic), the existence of turnover 
increases the chances that a treatment group member gains employment. When 
everyone has an equal chance of gaining employment, the direct effect of the 
treatment is pT, and the crowding-out rate equals 1 - λT/(pT) = 1 - λ/p. A key 
implication of this relationship is that if the treatment group is small relative to 
initial employment levels (i.e. for very small T) the crowding-out rate is close to 
100%. Intuitively, everyone, including the treatment group, has an almost 100% 
chance of getting a job. Given that almost all of the jobseekers are not treatment 
group members, it is most likely that those who miss out will not be members of 
the treatment group. 
In reality, it is unlikely that the treatment group have the same chance 
of gaining a job as untreated workers. Turnover will be less than 100%, so only a 
proportion of employed workers are at risk of losing their jobs. Furthermore, the 
treatment group members may be more or less efficient at securing the available 
jobs, either because of their search behaviour, or because they are not exactly the 
same as non-treatment group members. When the treatment group is different, 
their share of available jobs will depend also on how employers choose to 
combine them in production (the degree of complementarity or substitutability in 
production, as mentioned above in the context of subsidies).
4  
The more effectively the treatment group searches for jobs, the higher 
will be the proportion of the available jobs they will secure, and the higher will be 
the proportion of previously employed workers who fail to get a job. If all of the 
treatment group gain jobs, the proportion of those jobs that are at the expense of 
                                                             
4 The figure describes a market for homogeneous workers. Where there are different types of 
workers, the effect on employment depends on the inter-related demands for the various 
productive inputs. We would generally expect that an increase in supply of one type of labour 
would lower the price for that type of labour. More of that type of labour would be used, and less 
of other inputs. 9 
others is (1 - λ). The indirect effects (job losses by untreated workers) thus lie 
between 0 and (1 - λ).T. In addition, wages are lower as a result of the policy. 
2.2.1  The Layard and Nickell model 
While the competitive model is useful for illustrating the role of wage 
flexibility in dissipating supply or demand changes, and for illustrating the 
difference between direct effects of treatment and net employment change, it is 
limited in its treatment of unemployment and disequilibrium. For instance, one 
feature of the competitive model is that there is no involuntary unemployment. 
The people who do not have a job are those who respond to the lower wages by 
choosing to leave the labour market. There is nobody who is without a job but 
willing to work at the (lower) final wage. The model is well suited to analysing 
changes in long-term equilibrium, but it does not have much to say about the 
process of job and worker turnover and matching.  
For these reasons, most analytical treatments of ALMPs in the literature 
rely on a somewhat less constrained model of the labour market, which 
incorporates elements of wage bargaining and job search and matching, and 
contains a more explicit treatment of unemployment.  
Calmfors (1994) presented a framework for analysing the design of 
ALMPs. This framework stems from the earlier equilibrium wage and 
unemployment model developed by Layard (1986) and Layard et al. (1991). It has 
subsequently been used in many papers, including OECD (1993) and Calmfors et 
al. (2001). Although a formal derivation of the Layard and Nickell model is 
beyond the scope of the current paper, the following section summarises the key 
relevant features of the model for analysing the effects of ALMPs. The 
presentation here will follow that of Calmfors et al. (2001). 
The structure of the model can be summarised by the three curves that 
appear in Figure 3.  10 
Figure 3  : The Layard and Nickell model 
 
Source: Calmfors et al. (2001), Figure 4, p. 76 
The horizontal axis represents regular (i.e. excluding relief work) 
employment. The downward sloping Employment Schedule (ES) may be thought 
of as the familiar labour demand curve. It can also be derived as a reduced-form 
relationship between wages and employment, derived from a search model along 
the lines of Pissarides (1990), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The 
advantage of such a derivation is that it is possible to model how labour demand 
depends on the pattern of dynamics and matching in the labour market, and not 
just on the employment level. Shifts in the ES curve may arise for all of the same 
reasons that labour demand shifts. In addition, any aspect of matching that makes 
it more attractive to open up a job vacancy will raise the ES curve. For instance, 
employers will demand more employment at any given wage if worker quit rates 
drop; if hiring and firing costs drop; or if there is more efficient matching of 
vacancies and unemployed workers. 
The upward sloping wage setting schedule (WS) captures the fact that 
higher employment levels raise wage pressures. This relationship can be derived 
in a number of ways. It can be the outcome of collective bargaining; it can be the 
result of unilateral employer wage setting in a situation of ‘efficiency wages’ (i.e. 
where higher wages raise worker effort and hence productivity); or it can be the 11 
outcome of worker–employer bargaining. It is this final derivation that we will 
focus on.
5  
In the presence of hiring costs (or some other matching ‘friction’), each 
filled job earns a profit. Existing or new firms will open new vacancies up to the 
point where the profit associated with opening a vacancy is reduced to zero. At 
that point, the profit from having a filled job is still, however, positive. We say 
that the hiring costs generate ‘economic rents’ on filled jobs, and it is these rents 
that workers and employers bargain over. The WS curve shifts upwards in 
response to any factors that strengthen the relative bargaining power of workers, 
or otherwise raise the ability of workers to negotiate higher wages. More efficient 
matching means that vacancies are filled more quickly, which strengthens the 
employer’s hand in bargaining, moving the WS curve down. However, at any 
given employment level, a jobseeker’s probability of finding is independent of 
matching efficiency.
6 Higher unemployment benefit levels increase workers’ 
bargaining positions, leading to a rise in the WS curve.
7 
The vertical labour force curve (LF) to the right of the diagram 
represents the number of workers who are available for work and willing to work. 
For the purposes of modelling, it is assumed that workers are willing to work at 
any wage—a stark contrast with the upward sloping labour supply curve in the 
standard model. This strong assumption can be weakened to allow LF to slope 
upwards—the predictions of the model still hold as long as the LF curve is always 
to the right of the intersection of the ES and WS curves. 
Equilibrium in this model is determined by the intersection of the (ES) 
and (WS) curves. At this equilibrium there are still workers who are unemployed, 
but willing to work at the equilibrium wage. Unemployment equals the horizontal 
distance between this intersection and the vertical labour force curve. 
                                                             
5 For a more detailed derivation, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), or Pissarides (2000).   
6 See Calmfors et al. (2001), p. 77, footnote 5. 
7 The standard labour supply explanation for an upward sloping relationship between employment 
and wages still applies. Workers’ outside options (in the form of increasing marginal utility of 
leisure) increase as employment levels rise, strengthening their ability to negotiate higher wages. 
This mechanism alone cannot, however, account for the links between matching and equilibrium, 
or the existence of involuntary unemployment, which are generated within the Layard and Nickell 
model. 12 
Given the importance of the matching process in this version of the 
Layard and Nickell model, it is often presented alongside the Beveridge Curve, 
which summarises the relationship between unemployment and vacancies. A 
Beveridge Curve is shown as Figure 4. The Beveridge Curve can be viewed as an 
equilibrium relationship between unemployment and vacancies within a model of 
job matching. The downward sloping curve shows all combinations of 
unemployment and vacancy levels that generate the same number of job matches. 
Equilibrium employment in Figure 3 is associated with a unique ratio of 
unemployment to vacancies, and hence a unique point on the curve in Figure 4. 
An improvement in the efficiency of matching is captured as a movement inwards 
of the Beveridge Curve. For any level of unemployment, the same number of 
matches can be achieved with fewer vacancies. To link Figure 4 with Figure 3, we 
note that rising employment levels are associated with north-west movements 
along the Beveridge Curve, leading to higher vacancies and lower unemployment. 
For each employment level, there is a unique point on the Beveridge Curve that is 
consistent with stable unemployment. 
Figure 4  : The Beveridge Curve 
 
2.2.2 Characterising  ALMPs 
In order to analyse the impacts of active labour market policies within 
the framework of the Layard and Nickell model, we need to characterise policies 
in terms of the variables included in the model. Calmfors (1994) and Calmfors et 13 
al. (2001) group the effects of active labour market policies under the following 
headings (Calmfors et al. (2001), p. 76 ff.): 
effects on the matching process 
Improving the efficiency with which vacancies and unemployed 
workers are matched makes it more attractive for employers to open vacancies 
(ES moves up), and raises employers’ bargaining position (WS moves down).
8 
The net effect is higher employment and ambiguous wage effects (E+). 
effects on the competition for jobs 
Increasing the effectiveness with which jobseekers search for new jobs 
weakens the bargaining position of workers by making unemployment less 
attractive. The WS curve shifts down, leading to higher employment and lower 
wages (E+, W-). ‘Locking-in’ effects can have the opposite effect—while 
jobseekers are on labour market programmes, they may reduce their job search 
activities, reducing competition for jobs (E-, W+). 
productivity effects 
If workers are more productive, the value of a filled job increases and 
employers are willing to pay more (ES moves up). There may be an offsetting rise 
in the WS curve if workers raise their reservation wage. The net effect is for 
higher wages and (probably) higher employment (W+, e+). 
effects on the allocation of labour between sectors 
This case requires an extension of the basic model presented above. 
Because the WS curve is convex (curves upward), shifting workers from sectors 
where employment is high relative to labour force yields a larger decline in wages 
                                                             
8 This conclusion reflects the treatment in Calmfors et al. (2001). The derivation of the matching 
model in Chapter 1 of Pissarides (2000) suggests that the wage curve (WS) is independent of 
matching efficiency for a given level of ‘tightness’ (=V/U), and that matching efficiency affects 
only the ES curve. This contrasts with the argument in Calmfors et al. (2001) p. 77) that, for a 
given employment level, matching efficiency lowers the wage curve, and the presentation in Cahuc 
and Zylberberg (2004) Chapter 9), which suggests that it raises the wage curve. I have been able to 
reproduce Pissarides’ findings but have been unable to reconcile it with the other treatments. The 
outward shift in the ES curve is unambiguous. 14 
than the rise in wages resulting from their entering a low-employment sector. Net 
employment increases and (average) wages drop (E+, W-). 
direct crowding-out effects on regular labour demand 
This covers the ‘displacement’ and ‘substitution’ effects described 
above. Recall that subsidised employment is excluded from regular employment, 
as shown in Figure 3. Substitution and displacement therefore lead to a leftward 
shift of the ES curve, leading to lower employment and wages (E-, W-). 
accommodation effects of wage-setting 
If ALMPs reduce the costs and undesirability of unemployment, 
workers will be willing to negotiate for a higher wage since the threat of 
unemployment is not as great. The WS curve shifts up, leading to lower 
employment and higher wages (E-, W+). More stringent work testing, or 
requirements to participate in programmes, may make unemployment more 
undesirable, lowering WS and leading to higher employment and lower wages 
(E+, W-). 
The search and matching version of the Layard and Nickell model is 
thus able to illustrate how a range of different ALMPs can have effects on the 
level of employment. Without such effects, a positive direct employment effect of 
ALMPs would be possible only at the expense of non-participants. 
3 Estimation  approaches 
In general, impact evaluations of ALMPs estimate either the direct 
impact of a policy (on the treatment group), or the net impact of a policy (on total 
employment or fiscal costs). Estimating indirect effects is a subsidiary task, 
required for intermediate calculations. The use of, and interest in, estimates of 
indirect effects varies according to the task at hand. Consider the following 
equation for the net employment effect of an ALMP: 
  [E-EB] = [X-XB] – I (1) 
where E = total employment, X = outcomes for the treatment group; I = 
indirect effects; and the subscript B denotes a baseline or counterfactual level. The 15 
equation thus says that the growth in the number of jobs as a result of the policy 
(E - EB) equals the policy-induced increase in the number of jobs filled by the 
treatment group (X - XB), less the loss in jobs by non-participants. This 
relationship is summarised in Figure 5 


































Gross Employment Outcome (X)
 
The upper line in the graph represents the observed cumulative gross 
employment outcomes (X), expressed as the proportion of the participants who 
gain jobs, observed at various periods after the treatment is received. In this 
hypothetical example, outcomes range from 8% in the first month to over 30% 
after 10 months. This effect is graphically decomposed into three parts. The lower 
block shows the counterfactual outcomes that would have been observed in the 
absence of the programme (XB). The light band in the middle shows net 
employment creation, and the top band shows the indirect effect—placements of 
participants that have been achieved only at the expense of fewer non-participants 
having jobs.  
Because the upper line is cumulative, it should be non-decreasing 
(unless enough of the treatment group return to unemployment). Similarly, we 
would expect the counterfactual line to be non-decreasing.  
3.1 For  evaluation 
For an ex post evaluation of the impact of an ALMP, two of the 
quantities in Equation 1 will be known: total employment (E) and total number of 
jobs filled by the treatment group (X). There remain three unknown quantities (EB, 16 
XB, and I). Estimating any two of them is sufficient to identify the third, since the 
third can then be calculated using Equation 1. 
If the objective of the evaluation is to estimate direct effect (X-XB), we 
need to estimate only the counterfactual outcomes (XB) for the treatment group. 
While this may sound straightforward, finding ways to estimate such 
counterfactuals is the main focus of most of the quantitative evaluation literature. 
A review of these methods is beyond the scope of the current review, although 
Heckman et al. (1999) provide a thorough review of the main issues and 
approaches. 
If the objective of the evaluation is to estimate net employment effects 
(E - EB), there are two main approaches. 
First, we could estimate EB directly, using a model of the aggregate or 
local labour market. This would provide an estimate of what the level of 
employment would have been in the absence of any (policy) change. Unexplained 
changes in employment could be attributed to the policy, although this would 
reflect a lot of faith in the labour market model. To be more sure that the 
unexplained changes were a result of the policy rather than of other omitted 
variables, we would like to find a stronger test. For instance, we could use (ideally 
randomised) variation in the intensity of policy effects across local labour markets 
to pin down the correlation between unexplained employment change and the 
policy. If we were to take this first approach, and also obtain an estimate of the 
direct effect (X - XB), we could derive an estimate of I which, although not 
necessary, would be useful for future forecasting exercises, or as an input for the 
second approach to estimating net employment effects (see below).  
An alternative approach to estimating (E - EB) directly is to ignore 
flows into and out of the labour market, and use the negative of the net 
unemployment impact (U - UB) as a proxy for the employment impact. If workers 
are either employed or unemployed, then the change in employment equals -1 
times the change in unemployment. This general approach can be further refined 
by estimating separate counterfactuals for unemployment inflows and outflows, 
and comparing those with observed inflows and outflows. As for the identification 17 
of employment effects, using spatial (or other available) variation better to isolate 
the relationship between unexplained changes in flows and the policy is desirable. 
The second approach would be to estimate (E - EB) by using estimates 
of the other elements of Equation 1. Estimates of XB and I would be sufficient to 
generate an estimate of the net employment effect. XB can be obtained from an 
estimate of the direct effect (X - XB), as in the first approach. The remaining 
challenge is to separate the effects of the two remaining variables (EB and I). 
Without modelling aggregate labour market outcomes directly, we must obtain an 
estimate of I. This is problematic as there is not, in general, a reliable way to 
estimate I directly. We must use estimates of I obtained from other sources, such 
as previous evaluations that have taken the first approach of estimating EB 
directly. However, our estimate of the net employment effect is only as good as 
the external estimate of I. 
The choice of which approach to take comes down to which estimation 
method yields the more reliable (lower variance) estimates, given the data that are 
available. If we are confident about our external estimates of I then the second 
approach is fairly straightforward. If we are not, then we would prefer the first 
approach, as long as the errors in modelling total employment do not yield even 
greater errors. 
3.2 For  forecasting 
For the purposes of forecasting, the challenges are greater, and we are 
forced to rely to a greater extent on externally derived assumptions and 
parameters. None of the five unknown quantities in Equation 1 (E, EB, X, XB, I) is 
observed.  
Two assumptions are needed to forecast direct effects. We could use 
assumed values for both X and XB, which would be sensible if we were confident 
about our forecasts of both the counterfactuals and the gross employment 
outcomes. Alternatively, we may have more confidence in our ability to forecast 
the relationship between these two quantities than to independently forecast the 
levels of both. For instance, we may have prior information on the likely 
‘deadweight ratio’ (δ = XB/X), which is the proportion of outcomes that would 18 
have occurred in the absence of any policy change. In this case it is sufficient to 
make assumptions about δ and XB. An estimate of (X - XB) is then available as a 
simple scaling of XB: X - XB = XB*(1 - δ)/δ. 
Using Equation 1, we can see that forecasting (E - EB) requires making 
three assumptions—one for each of the unknowns on the right-hand side of the 
equation. Obtaining an independent estimate of I (the number of jobs filled by 
participants that were at the expense of non-participants) is likely to be difficult. 
There may be more stability and predictability in the ratio of indirect to direct 
effects (γ = I / (X - XB)). Using the definitions of δ and γ, Equation 1 becomes: 
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so that the forecast of the net employment effect is generated as a 
proportion of the baseline (counterfactual) outcomes. Equivalently, the net 
employment effect can be expressed as a proportion of the gross employment 
outcomes: E - EB = X(1 - δ)(1 - γ). The three parameters for the forecast are for 
XB, δ, and γ. Equation 1 can be rewritten in many different forms, depending on 
what information is available. For instance, forecasters may have good estimates 
of the ratio of gross employment outcomes to participants (X/P or XB/P), in which 
case a different version of Equation 1 can be derived. 
3.3  The special case of subsidies: substitution and 
displacement effects 
As in the theory section, wage subsidies are a special case, in that 
indirect effects can, at least conceptually, be separated into substitution (S) and 
displacement (D) effects (I=S+D). Substitution occurs where employers substitute 
cheaper (subsidised) workers for other workers. Displacement occurs where firms 
with subsidised workers can out-compete other firms, causing those other firms to 
reduce employment.  
Separating the indirect effects into substitution and displacement effects 
is advantageous for forecasting and estimation only if reliable estimates are 
available for at least one of these components separately, or if a subsequent 
evaluation will be able to isolate one of these effects and compare it against initial 19 
estimates. Otherwise, it would be simpler to use an estimate of their sum, since 
the two effects enter into calculations in the same way. 
Substitution and displacement effects are customarily summarised as 
proportions, either of gross outcomes (X) or of the direct effect (X - XB), giving the 
following two possible forms for Equation 1: 
  S = σX, D=φX => E-EB = X(1 - δ - σ - φ) (3a) 
  S = σ(X - XB), D=φ(X - XB) => E - EB = X(1 - δ)(1 - σ - φ) (3b) 
In the second of these specifications, the indirect effects appear as a 
factor (1 - σ - φ) that scales the direct effect (X(1 - δ)). Some authors extend this 
‘factoring’ approach and express the indirect effects factor in the form  
(1 - σ’)(1 - φ’).
9 
There are two reasons that these effects make sense only in the case of 
subsidies. First, only with subsidies is it possible to identify directly affected jobs 
and firms as well as directly affected jobseekers. Second, only with subsidies can 
the policy be characterised as a price change. These unique features of subsidy 
programmes also open up possibilities for testing and estimating effects. 
Direct interviewing: Some studies of wage subsidy programmes have 
estimated substitution effects by directly asking employers whether the subsidised 
hire is additional to hires that would otherwise have been made. Given that 
‘additionality’ is often a requirement of wage subsidy hires, we might expect 
employers to understate the extent of substitution. Where there is substitution, 
some studies also ask whether the particular person hired would have been hired 
in the absence of the subsidy. Within the context of studies of subsidy 
programmes, this is referred to as a ‘deadweight effect’. The use of the term in 
this context is narrower than the concept of deadweight effect shown by δ in the 
equation. In the equation, δ refers to the proportion of positive outcomes for the 
treatment group that would have found jobs even without the policy. 
                                                             
9 The parameters will be different, since (1 - σ - φ) = (1 - σ)(1 - φ) - σφ. 20 
In the wage-subsidy context, ‘deadweight’ often refers to the proportion 
of subsidised hires where the employer would have hired the same person even 
without the subsidy. We will refer to this form of deadweight effect as ‘firm 
deadweight’. It is a subset of deadweight as measured by δ, since participants who 
are placed in a specific job that they would have secured anyway are a subset of 
participants who would have secured a job without the subsidy. 
Firm-based counterfactuals: If it were possible to model counterfactual 
employment levels for firms that employed subsidised workers, the resulting 
estimates would provide a means of estimating substitution effects. I have not 
seen any studies taking this approach. 
General equilibrium modelling: Because subsidies can be modelled as a 
change in price, they are well suited to modelling within a general equilibrium 
framework. This approach explicitly models economy-wide adjustments to 
changes in prices, labour supply, etc. By comparing the estimated employment 
level before and after the inclusion of a policy effect in the model, we can get an 
estimate of economy-wide displacement effects. 
4 Empirical  estimates 
There is a startling lack of empirical estimates in the evaluation 
literature of indirect effects of ALMPs. The primary focus of most of the literature 
has been on direct effects—the effect of treatment on the treated. For instance, in 
Heckman et al. (1999), only 11 of the 232-page chapter reviewing ‘the economics 
and econometrics of active labour market programmes’ deals with indirect effects, 
and of this, almost half is devoted to a review of a single study (Heckman et al. 
(1998)). Smith (2000, p. 33) refers to “the literature’s general avoidance of the 
topic [of general equilibrium effects]”. 
Many studies contain explicit comments about the importance of 
indirect, macroeconomic, and general equilibrium effects, and note that it is not 
possible to evaluate programmes fully with only direct effects. Very few, 
however, make any attempt to estimate indirect effects. The studies that do 
contain estimates of indirect effects are almost exclusively studies of wage 21 
subsidies or, to a lesser extent, training programmes. Except in the wage subsidy 
studies, most empirical work attempts to estimate net employment effects, and is 
not concerned with deriving estimates of indirect effects. As far as I can tell, there 
is a complete absence of studies that independently estimate direct effects and net 
employment effects, which is what would be needed to derive an independent 
estimate of the strength of indirect effects. 
There are four streams of empirical studies of indirect effects of 
ALMPs, reflecting different estimation strategies, and to some extent different 
interests. 
First, there are studies that derive estimates by surveying employers or 
participants and asking them directly about the extent of indirect effects. These 
studies are particularly relevant for wage subsidies. Some of these studies also 
supplement survey responses with administrative data. Section 7 of OECD (1993) 
summarises findings from several such studies, and Tables 10 and 11 of Calmfors 
et al. (2001) list similar Swedish studies. 
The second stream of studies link regional employment outcomes to 
measures of programme intensity across regions to identify net employment 
effects, usually expressed as a proportion of programme participants (subsidised 
jobs). These studies are really only suitable for examining fairly large-scale 
programmes, as it would be difficult to separate the impacts of small programmes 
from random variation in employment. The studies in this stream often use 
dynamic panel analysis methods for estimation. Within this stream there are two 
main approaches. Most authors take a ‘reduced form’ approach, essentially 
regressing employment levels on ALMP intensity. An alternative approach is 
taken by some authors such as Hagen (2003), who adopt a theoretically-based 
structural model and estimate the parameters of the model. There is growing use 
of structural matching models, based on a search version of the Layard and 
Nickell model presented above. 
Studies from the third stream group ALMPs into broad categories and 
use cross-country variation in expenditure/GDP or participants/labour force as an 
ALMP measure, to examine links between ALMPs and national labour market 22 
outcomes. There have been a large number of such cross-country studies, many 
using data from the OECD. In many cases the main focus of the studies is not on 
ALMPs but on examining links between economic performance and labour 
market institutions more generally, as summarised by Nickell and Layard (1999). 
Studies of this type that are primarily focused on ALMPs include Jackman et al. 
(1990), OECD (1993), and Estevao (2003). Several others are summarised in 
Section 5 of Calmfors et al. (2001). 
The fourth stream of studies use calibrated theoretical models to 
estimate the quantitative impact of simulated policy changes. Not surprisingly 
given the large investment needed to build such models, there are only a few 
examples, the most prominent of which are Davidson and Woodbury (1993), and 
Heckman et al. (1998). 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide an indicative list of studies and summarise 
their findings. The list is not exhaustive. I have attempted to present findings in a 
way that is consistent with the notation introduced earlier. All of the studies listed 
in Table 1 are studies of wage subsidy programmes, and reflect a variety of 
estimation approaches. Many of the studies contain multiple estimates of the 
parameters of interest. Where possible, I have used the authors’ preferred 
estimate. Otherwise I have preferred estimates that best control for problems of 
omitted variables and endogeneity of ALMPs.
10 
While there is a good deal of variation in findings, the overall pattern is 
of large indirect effects. Net employment growth due to wage subsidies is 
generally estimated to be around 5–10% of the gross effect ((E - EB)/X). Different 
studies attribute different amounts of the indirect effect to deadweight, 
substitution, and displacement, although these terms are used in different ways, 
and in some cases interchangeably, in different studies. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the patterns of findings, we can link the findings to the 
terminology used in this paper as follows: deadweight effects (δ) in the order of 
                                                             
10 Endogeneity arises where causality runs from employment levels to ALMPs rather than from 
ALMPs to employment, yielding biased estimates. Such a problem may arise if ALMP 
expenditure falls in response to employment growth. Many of the studies use some form of 
instrumental variables estimation to control for this problem. 23 
60%; substitution (S/X) of around 25%; and displacement (D/X) of around 5%. 
Net employment effects are generally somewhat larger for subsidy programmes 
that are not targeted at the private sector. 
Table 2 reports a selection of findings from studies that are not focused 
on wage subsidies. Many of the studies in Table 2 provide analyses of overall 
ALMP participation or expenditure. Some of them also disaggregate these 
measures into broad categories of ALMP, such as training, subsidies, placement 
services, and work experience. Rather than report all findings, I have listed only 
main insights from each of the studies.  
The findings from Table 2 are in general more ‘broad brush’ than those 
in Table 1, reflecting a broader interest in the impacts of ALMPs rather than in the 
impact of a particular programme. Many of them also focus on unemployment 
rather than employment, or on wage pressure rather than on net employment 
effects. Overall, the findings are that ALMP expenditures tend to decrease open 
unemployment (i.e. excluding programme participants), and to have more positive 
effects on total unemployment. The estimated impact of ALMP expenditure on 
wage pressure appears to vary quite a lot across studies. 
It is difficult to link these general findings to the factors expressed in 
Equation 1. The studies give an indication of the direction of net employment 
effects but they are generally expressed in terms of their links to expenditures, and 
cannot easily be translated into indirect effects per participant, as would be needed 
to incorporate them into Equation 1. Estevao (2003), and the various studies 
summarised in Section 5 of Calmfors et al. (2001), frame and interpret their work 
in the context of the Layard and Nickell model presented above. In many cases 
though, the empirical estimates are of the reduced form relationship between 
ALMPs on the one hand and wages, employment, or unemployment on the other. 
The theory generally serves mainly as motivation, and is at this stage more well 
developed than the accompanying empirical work. 
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Table 1:  Summary of empirical studies of indirect effects—subsidy policies 
Authors  Type of programme  Method  Indirect effect estimated 
Subsidies     
New Zealand Department of Labour 
(1984)  
Private sector wage subsidy  Survey: direct questions  Substitution (S/X): 65% (brought forward 
hiring) 
Calmfors et al. (2001)   Various forms of partial or full subsidy 
programmes 
Summarising 11 direct interview studies  Substitution (S/X): 39%–84% (larger 
where programme is close to ‘regular’ 
labour market) 
Davidson and Woodbury (1993)  Re-employment subsidy  General equilibrium simulation modelling 
(with fixed prices) using a search model 
Net effect ((E-EB/X): 40–70%  
Calmfors et al. (2001)   Various forms of partial or full subsidy 
programmes 
Summarising six econometric studies, 
each of which covered one or more 
programmes. Mostly panel of local areas 
(one aggregate time series) 
‘Displacement’ (not D/X): typically well 
above 60% 
=> Net effect ((E - EB/X) below 40% 
Kangasharju and Venetoklis (2003)   Wage subsidy  Panel analysis of firm unit record data  Deadweight + substitution 46% 
Displacement: Not significant 
Breen and Halpin (1989) (as reported in 
OECD (1993), Table 2.10) 
Employment subsidy  Employer interviews  Deadweight ((X - XB)/X): 70% 
Substitution (S/X): 21% 
Displacement (D/X): 4% 
de Koning et al. (1992) (cited in OECD 
(1993), Table 2.10) 
Private sector wage subsidy  Econometric analysis of placement data; 
employer interviews 
Deadweight ((X - XB)/X): near 0 
Deadweight + substitution: 76–89% 
Blake et al. (1999) (cited in OECD 
(1993), Table 2.10) 
Private sector wage subsidy  Participant and employer interviews; 
register data on other unemployed persons 
Deadweight ((X - XB)/X): 67–79% 
Forslund and Krueger (1997); also cited 
by Calmfors et al. (2001) 
Public relief workers (full subsidy)  Regress unsubsidised jobs on lagged 
number of subsidised jobs 
Net effect ((E - EB/X): (1–69)=31% 
Hagen (2003)  Wage subsidy in non-profit organisations  Estimated matching function and dynamic 
panel estimation of local labour demand 
Net effect [E - EB]/X: 6–10% 
Katz (1998)   10% wage subsidy for low wage workers  Impose supply and demand elasticities on 
competitive equilibrium model 
Wages rise by 2% 
Employment of low wage workers rises 
by 0.8% 
Hujer et al. (2002)  Job subsidy  Dynamic panel GMM using regional 
variation in participant numbers 
Unemployment rate lowered for one 
quarter 
Heckman et al. (1998)   Tuition subsidy  General equilibrium simulation modelling 
of the impact of a revenue-neutral $500 
increase in tuition subsidy 
Substitution: college enrolment up 0.5% 
(up 5.3% if relative prices are held 
constant) 
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Table 2:  Summary of empirical studies of indirect effects—other policies 
Authors  Type of programme  Method  Indirect effect estimated 
Calmfors et al. (2001)  Cross-country evidence on impact of 
increased ALMP participation by 1% of 
Labour Force 
Summarising 10 studies  Open
11 unemployment: 0–1.5% reduction 
Calmfors et al. (2001)  Various forms of ALMP (mainly relief work 
and training) 
Estimated wage-setting schedules  Wage pressures increased by ALMP (nil or 
negative effect for training) 
Calmfors et al. (2001) Section 
4.1) 
Measures of participation in various forms of 
ALMP 
Studies estimating Beveridge Curves, 
matching functions, and geographic mobility 
Weak positive or no effect on matching 
efficiency 
Mixed results on geographic mobility 
(interpreted as matching efficiency)  
Hujer et al. (2002)  Participants in vocational training  Dynamic panel GMM using regional 
variation in participant numbers 
Unemployment rate lowered slightly 
Altavilla and Caroleo (2002)  Participants in all programmes  Dynamic panel GMM and panel VAR 
modelling using regional data 
Unemployment rate lowered  
Speckesser (2003)  UK and German subsidy and training  Dynamic panel estimation using regional 
variation 
Impact on unemployment and on matching 
efficiency “results . . . weak and not robust” 
Hagen (2003)  Subsidised training  Estimated matching function, and dynamic 
panel estimation of local labour demand 
No effect on matching or total employment 
Calmfors et al. (2001), Table 15)  ALMP expenditure per person   Summarised 10 reduced form studies using 
either cross-section or panel analysis of 
OECD countries 
Reductions in open unemployment, with 
smaller reductions or increases of total 
unemployment 
Estevao (2003)  ALMP expenditure as a proportion of GDP  Cross-country panel estimation of reduced 
form relationships, as well as estimation of a 
wage-setting schedule 
Employment increased 
•  particularly for subsidies and 
measures for disabled 
•  no training effect 
•  employment lowered by placement 
services 
Wage pressure lowered 
•  especially for training and subsidies 
•  placement services raise wage 
pressure 
                                                             
11 Open unemployment = (total unemployment, including ALMP participants) – ALMPs participants 26 
5 Summary   
This paper was prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of Social 
Development, as an input into its ongoing work to analyse, evaluate, and forecast 
the impacts of ALMPs in New Zealand. The review updates and extends previous 
work of Chapple (1999). 
The paper sets out some key issues in thinking about and estimating 
indirect effects of labour market policies. The indirect effect of an ALMP is the 
effect that it has on people other than those in the treatment group. In general, the 
nature of indirect effects is that some of the gains made by the treatment group are 
at the expense of other workers or jobseekers, although it is theoretically possible 
that policies that improve the prospects of assisted jobseekers also improve 
outcomes for other workers. 
In the special case of policies that change the cost of labour to the 
employer (e.g. wage subsidies), there is a meaningful distinction between 
substitution and displacement effects. Substitution effects arise when employers 
choose to employ cheaper, subsidised workers instead of other workers. 
Displacement occurs where firms employing subsidised workers are able to 
produce goods more cheaply and increase their market share, at the expense of 
unsubsidised firms. 
Indirect effects are generally ignored in evaluation studies, where the 
focus is commonly on the improvements in outcomes for assisted jobseekers 
(direct effects). The direct effect of an ALMP is the improvement in outcomes, 
relative to what the treatment group would have experienced in the absence of the 
policy. The term ‘deadweight’ is used to refer to treatment group outcomes that 
would have occurred even without the treatment.
12 
In the absence of indirect effects, the direct effect of a policy is matched 
by a net increase in employment. Net employment growth equals the direct effect, 
less indirect effects: [E - EB]=[X - XB] - I.  
                                                             
12 The use of the terms ‘substitution’, ‘displacement’, and ‘deadweight’ varies within the literature. 27 
The examination of indirect effects is thus tantamount to examining the 
ability of policies to generate employment increases. While the competitive model 
of the labour market is a good starting point, we need a more sophisticated model 
if we are to examine the impacts of different labour market policies—one that 
captures some of the key institutional features of the labour market. The 
equilibrium unemployment model introduced by Layard and Nickell is widely 
adopted for analysing ALMPs. This model emphasises the process of matching 
unemployed workers to vacancies. Policies that improve the rate or quality of 
matching can increase employment.  
In order to estimate the strength of indirect effects, we need estimates of 
both the net employment increase, [E - EB], and the direct employment effect  
[X - XB]. Generally, the information required to estimate each of these two 
elements differs. The net employment increase is commonly estimated based on 
variation in local programme intensity and predicted local labour market 
outcomes, often with particular attention paid to employment of groups of 
workers whose employment is expected to be most affected by the treatment 
group. Direct employment effects are estimated by comparing outcomes for the 
treatment group with an estimate of what their outcomes would have been without 
the policy (usually modelled as a function of outcomes for a comparison group). 
For the purposes of forecasting net employment effects, more 
assumptions are needed. There are a number of forms that the assumptions can 
take, depending on what information is most reliable or available. 
It is difficult to compare estimates of the strength of indirect effects. 
Different studies vary in their approaches, definitions, and the form of their 
estimates. Empirical estimates of indirect effects are available almost exclusively 
for one particular type of policy—wage subsidy programmes. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the insights from many studies, the general findings are of 
deadweight effects of around 60% of gross employment outcomes, and net 
employment of 5–10% of gross outcomes. Indirect effects are thus around 30–
35% of gross outcomes, or about three-quarters of the direct employment effect 
(30%/(100% - 60%)). The indirect effects of 30% of gross outcomes are 
accounted for by substitution (25 points) and displacement (5 points). 28 
For policies other than wage subsidies, studies tend to estimate net 
employment effects rather than indirect effects. The theory is better developed 
than the empirical work in studies of non-subsidy policies, and the nature of 
predicted effects is thus better understood than the size of indirect effects. 
Preparing policy costings and forecasts is going to require a good deal 
of judgement and sensitivity analysis for the foreseeable future, until a more 
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